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Good Will in Professional Partnerships
HERiB3ERT D. LAUBE*
What is 'good will'?
In 1882 Lord Justice Cotton said that it is "a word of which few
people understand the meaning."' Nearly a decade before, one
writer complained that the American courts and text writers had
not given us "very definite notions upon the subject."'2 Half a
century later, another writer advised us that although the American
courts recognize the importance of managerial ability as a funda-
mental element in good will, the judges are "somewhat at sea"
regarding it.3
ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE GOOD WILL
Good will is subtle and elusive. It is invisible and intangible.
It has been variously defined. Chief Justice Fuller said that although
undoubtedly in many cases it is a valuable thing, there is difficulty
in deciding accurately what is included in the term.4 Of all defi-
nitions, Lord Eldon's has been characterized as probably the narrow-
est.5 Lord Eldon is generally quoted as having said that good will
"is nothing more than the probability that the old customers will
resort to the old place."6 An examination of the decision shows that
he had under consideration the sale of the good will which was
incident to the business of a common carrier, and which was sold
with the premises. Sir George Jessel remarked that "Of course in
such a business as that there was really nothing more. ' 7 But, as
was pointed out in Churton v. Douglas, "it would be taking too narrow
a view of what is laid down by Lord Eldon to say that it is confined
to that." Lord Herschell' was not satisfied that Lord Eldon intended
*Assistant Professor, Cornell Law School.
'Cooper v. Metropolitan Board of Works, L. R. 25 Ch. D. 472, 479 (1882).
2Redield, How the Good-Will is to be Dealt with in Partnerships (1870) 9 Am. L.
REG. (N. s.) 65, 69.3Foreman, Conflicting Theories of Good Will (1922) 22 COL. L. lRv. 638, 643.4Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U. S. 436, 446, 13 Sup. Ct.
944 (1893).
'2 R. C. L. 976, 977 (1916).6Crutwell v. Lye, 17 Ves. Jr. 334, 346 (18io).7Ginesi v. Cooper, 14 Ch. D. 596, 6oi (x88o).
sJohns. 174, 188 (859).
9Trego v. Hunt, (1896) A. C. 7, i6. "If the language of Lord Eldon is to be
taken as a definition of goodwill of general application, I think it is far too narrow,
and I am not satisfied that it was intended by Lord Eldon as an exhaustive
definition."
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it as an exhaustive definition. Whether he did or not, it has been
often so regarded. 10
The more comprehensive conception of good will of Judge Story
has received frequent approval. He described it to be "the advantage
or benefit which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere
value of the capital, stock, funds, or property employed therein,
in consequence of the general patronage and encouragement, which
it receives from constant and habitual customers, on account of its
local position, or common celebrity, a reputation for skill or affluence
or punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances or necessities
or even from ancient partialities or prejudices.""' Wagner does not
regard this as exclusive or exhaustive, because it does not include
the prestige derived from a trademark or tradename.12 Bates seems
to liberalize the conception. To him, it includes "every possible
advantage acquired by the firn in carrying on its business, whether
connected with the premises or name or other matter." 3 To Parsons,
good will is "nothing more than a hope, grounded upon probability.' 4
To Professor Mechem, that is its substantial essence. 5 That notion
of good will erroneously seems to place the emphasis upon the
inducement for buying good will rather than upon the advantage
or benefit which is purchased. Good will denotes "the benefit arising
from connection and reputation, and its value is what can be got for
the chance of being able to keep the connection and improve it."'' 6
10"No subsequent definition has changed in anymaterialrespeetthis rendition,
and all the writers seem to have recognized and adopted it." Crawford, J., in
Porter & Mumford v. Gorman, 65 Ga. II, 14 (1880). "Lord Eldon defined this
(good will) about as well as it can be defined.. ." PARSONS, T., PARTNERSHIP
(4 th ed. 1893) 239.
"STORY, PARTNERSHIP (6th ed. 1868) § 99. "It would be difficult, if indeed
possible, to frame a more accurate and compehensive definition." HOPKINS,
UNFAIR TRADE (i900) 132. Mr. Chief Justice Fuller adopted it in haec verba
in Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., supra note 4.
12WAGNER, DAMAGES, PROFITS AND ACCOUNTING IN PATENT CASES (1926) 331.
"SBATES, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (1888) § 657. "'Goodwill', I apprehend, must
mean every advantage-every positive advantage, if I may so express it, as
contrasted with the negative advantage of the late partner not carrying on the
business himself-that has been acquired by the old firm in carrying on its business
whether connected with the premises in which the business waspreviously carried
on, or with the name of the firm, or with any other matter carrying with it the
benefit of the business." Vice Chancellor Sir W. Page Wood in Churton v.
Douglas, supra note 8. See brief of attorneys for appellees in Douthart v. Logan,
86 Ill. App. 294 (1899).
"
4PARSONS, T., PARTNERSHIP (4th ed. 1893) 239.
15MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF PARTNERSHIP (1920) 114.
"6LINDLEY, PARTNERSHIP (9th ed. 1924) 534. Woerner confuses good will with
its price. "It is described as the sum which a person would be willing to give
for the chance of being able to keep the trade established at a particular place,
or rather it is the price to be paid for the advantage of carrying on the business
either on the premises or with the stock of the old firm, or connected therewith
by name, or in some manner attracting the customers of the old to the new
business ... ." WOERNER, AMERICAN LAW OFADMINISTRATION (3rd ed. 1923) 440.
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Why do these ideas of good will vary so widely? Allan attributes
the difficulty of definition mainly to the fact that good will is incapable
of separate existence.'7 Gilmore thinks that it is partly due to the
fact that it has not been recognized as a business asset until com-
paratively recent times.'8 Perhaps, it is because, as Lindley asserts,
"it can hardly be said to have any precise signification."' 9 This is
doubtless true. Good will varies with the nature of the business to
which it is incident.20 Pollock regards the term as commercial rather
than legal.2' Primarily, good will is a question of fact rather than
law. That is the reason that the concept of good will of the economist
is out of harmony with the legal concept of good will. It is treated
as property because "if that which is, in fact, a valuable interest,
were not treated as one, injustice would be done." The obstacle
to clear perception has been characterized very aptly in Armstrong
v. Bitner. "Attempts have been made to formulate rules and defi-
nitions, which would measure, as by a geometrical scale, the trans-
actions occurring in different departments of business, although they
are marked in their detail, and in the mode of their management by
a vast variety of features."2 4 This is what Dean Pound calls a "juris-
prudence of rules."25  Lord Eldon's particular application of the
concept of good will degenerated into a rule. Many a subsequent
decision bears evidence that the judge failed to perform the "useful
labor of giving fresh illustration of the intelligent application" of the
concept to a concrete cause.2 6 When one is assured that "only a
complete study of a score or more of theories will give one a full
understanding of legal good will,"' 27 one may discover that the
theories are founded upon cases which are classified largely upon
a basis of similarity of facts.
THE INCmENT OF GOOD WILL
The much quoted definition of Lord Eldon made good will local.
Under the influence of that "ancient idea," only local good will
was recognized, in the earlier decisions, as a pecuniary interest.2 8
17ALLAN, ON GOOD WILL (1889) 4.
1 GILMoRE, PARTNERSHIP (1911) 137.19LINDLEY, supra note 16.
20Wedderburn v. Wedderburn, 22 Bevan 84, 104 (I856).21POLLOCK, THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (IIth ed. 1920) 123.
nFoREmN, supra note 3, at 638.23PARsONS, supra note 14.
24Bryan, J., in Armstrong v. Bitner, 71 Md. I18, 125, 17 AtI. 1054, 120 AtI. 136
(1889).25Law in Books and Law in Action, (i9io) 44 Am. L. REV. 12, 20.
26Pound, Meclnical Jurisprudence, (19o8) 8 COL. L. REv. 605.27FORE)&AN, supra note 3, at 639.28PARSONS, supra note 14, foot-note (s).
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As late as 1883, it was declared that good will is "never an incident
of a stock of merchandise; but generally speaking, it is an incident
of locality or place, of the store-room or place of business." 29 In
Sheldon v. Houghton,0 it was stated that it could "adhere to, spring
out of corporeal property, or a tangible locality or establishment,"
but it must rest upon some tangible thing. By the same primitive
conception, the good will of a baker"' was regarded as clearly incident
to his shop, and the good will of an upholsterer2 was inseparable
from his leasehold. For some reason, its parasitic adhesiveness
localized it. 3
Of course, the foundation of any advantage which one may gain
from good will depends upon many things besides place.3 4 Indeed,
"it would be absurd to say, that where a large wholesale business
is conducted, the public are mindful whether it is carried on at one
end of the Strand or the other, or in Fleet Street, or in the Strand
or any place adjoining, and that they regard that, and do not regard
the identity of the house of business,-namely the firm."35 Former-
ly, location may have been an important and controlling element in
good will. Business was done face to face. People acquired the
29Rawson v. Pratt, 91 Ind. 9, I6 (1883). In Van Dyke v. Jackson, i E. D.
Smith 421 (N. Y. 1851) the Court, in discussing the good will of a victualing
saloon, said that "If it was not thus attached to the place, if it could be detachedand used separate therefrom" it was "at least a novel suggestion."
Fed. Cas. No. 12, 748, 5 Blatch. 285 (1865). If good will be a 'parasite,' it
is a 'parasite' of the business from which it sprung, not the mere machinery by
which the business was conducted." Lacombe, J., infra note 35. "But the good
will of a business may be sold independently. A physician may sell the good
will of his practice without selng his office furniture or his surgical instruments.
So the lawyer may sell the good will of his cientage without selling his library.
The same rule applies to the good will of a mercantile business; in fact to good
will generally." Brett v. Ebel, 29 App. Div. 256, 258, 5I N. Y. Supp. 573 (Ist
Dept. 1898).3 1King v. Midland Ry., 17 Weekly Rep. 113 (1868).
32 Chissum v. Dewes, .5 Russell 29 (1828).33Good will is either "appurtenant to the ownership of property and the right
to occupy the place where the business has been before carried on, or as a separate
and distinct right to continue the same business at the same place and in the
same name, and to exclude all others from exercising a similar privilege to the
extent of infringing the exclusive rights of the purchaser of the good-will. These
two species of good-will may conveniently be distinguished as good-will in gross
and good will appurtenant to the place and property." How Good-Will Is To Be
Dealt with in Partnerships, (1870) 9 MAe. L. REG. (N. s.) 65, 68.34Rowell v. Rowell, 122 Wis. I, 17, 99 N. W. 473 (1904).3 Churton v. Douglas, supra note 8. In speaking of the publishing house of
"Harper & Bros.", Mr. Justice Lacombe said "If its present establishment in
Franklin Square were destroyed by fire tomorrow, and everything therein con-
tained were swept out of existence, it is surely manifest that so long as the firm
itself survived, and continued to transact its old business, it would still hold its
'good will', although the business should be thence forward conducted in a new
building erected in some uptown street, and supplied with entirely new machinery
and equipments." Washburn v. National Wall-paper Co., 81 Fed. 17, 20,
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1897).
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"locality habit." 6  With modem methods of distribution, it may
have no value. Where a jewelry business57 is a mail order business,
the existence of good will can not be dependent upon the fact that
"the business should be continued at 49 instead of 5i Maiden Lane."
Where less than two per cent of the customers of an importing firm3
visit the store, the importance of good will is dependent on the
repute and standing of the name and not upon the location of the
business. A literary enterprise, "9 jointly pursued, is wholly inde-
pendent of place. The business can be prosecuted from one place
quite as advantageously as from another.
Attempts have been made to classify good will as personal or
local.40 According to a recent work,41 local good will embraces three
elements: site, building and equipment, and reputation. The third
element of local good will is obviously the result of management,
which is personal. Long ago, Allan4 pointed out that the classifi-
cation of good will as local and personal is happy so far as it goes,
but it does not include those cases where the good will attaches to the
finm name. As a rule, good will inheres in the business and not in
the locality.43  Certainly, all businesses, not local, cannot be con-
sidered as having purely personal good will. Usually, good will
is attached to a place, an established business or a name known to
the trade." It may be created in connection with any business,
enterprise, occupation or profession.45 It may adhere to a locality
or an established business, the tangible assets of a trade, the right
to use a particular name, trade-mark or valuable trade secret.46
The distinguishing feature of local good will is that location is one of
the identifying means which people have of determining the place
where or the article which they wish to buy.47 At any rate, the
"
6 ROGERS, GOODWILL, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAI TRADING (1914) 17. "The
manner of conducting business has changed since that day. The wholesale houses
now carry on the mass of their business by means of agents or persons soliciting
trade, or through the medium of the mails; customers rarely if ever, visit the
place of business." Champlin, C. J., dissenting, in Williams v. Farrand, 88 Mich.
473, 520, 5o N. W. 446 (1891).
:'Myers Co. v. Tuttle, 183 Fed. 235, 237 (Cir. Ct. S. D. N. Y. 191o).
8In re Silkman, 121 App. Div. 202, 105 N. Y. Supp. 872, 881 (2nd Dept. 1907).
39Case and Opinion respecting the "Good Will" of a Newspaper Establishment
(1837) I6 AM. JUR. 87, 88 (1837).40Ex parte Thomas, 2 M. D. & DeG. 294, 296 (1841); Bates, supra note 13.
4 1HoPKINS, LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
(4 th ed. 1924) 218.
42Supra note 17 at 8.431MECHEM, supra note 15 at 115.
44People v. Roberts, 159 N. Y. 70, 83, 53 N. E. 685 (1899).
4"HOPKINS, supra note 41.
4628 C. J. 732.
4 7
ROGERS, supra note 36 at 20.
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inadequacy of the classification of the elements of a concept, which
are as varied as its applications may be numerous, is obvious. The
cases cannot be forced into the "pigeon-holes the books have pro-
vided." 48
Courts have confused productive efficiency, which attracts trade
and promotes good will with the good will itself.49 When a firm has
carried on a particular business for a period of years and "has been
so scrupulous in fulfilling every obligation, so careful in maintaining
the standard of goods dealt in, so absolutely honest and fair in all
business dealings that customers of the finn have become convinced
that their experience in the future will be as satisfactory as it has
been in the past, while such customers' good report of their own
experience tends continually to bring new customers to the same
concern, there has been produced a value quite as important-in
some cases, perhaps, more important-than the plant or machinery
with which the business is carried on."5 0 The source of this good
will is the scrupulosity, the painstaking industry and honesty of the
management. Good will is the result of the qualities of the manage-
ment. It was created by effort which was personal. The good will
which is the result of the effort may be impersonal. In this case it
was.5' Where the members of a firm contribute "intelligence,
fortune, credit, or integrity" the firm acquires a reputation which
has value. 2 Good will is represented by that "economic value
recognized in law and denoting the chance of future profit." In
Williams v. Farrand, it was said to be "those intangible advantages
or incidents which are impersonal, so far as the grantor is concerned."5 4
Must it be impersonal in its origin? If all partners are equally
important and efficient in partnership affairs and by joint skill and
influence build up a-profitable hotel business, is the good will personal
or impersonal?55 In Williams v. Wilson and McClellan,6 three
partners, conducted an establishment which was in part a private
asylum and in part a boarding-house for immigrants. Two were
48PouND, supra note 25 at 20.
49FORESMAN, supra note 3 at 652.5OLacombe, J., supra note 35 at 2o. The reason given, in an early case, for
good will not being deemed an asset of a deceased partner's estate was that it
"might subsist for the benefit of an executor who may not have skill therein."
Pearce v. Chamberlain, 2 Ves. Sr. 33 (1750).5INo one would doubt that, under the decisions, the good will of a firm engaged
in the manufacture of wall-paper is so impersonal that it can be assigned.
5"Fenn v. Bolles, 7 Abb. Pr. 202, 203 (N. Y. 1858).
,
3Matter of Borden, 95 Misc. 443, 444, 159 N. Y. Supp. 346 (1916).
"Williams v. Farrand, 88 Mich. 473, 5o N. W. 446 (1891).
"Mitchell v. Reed, 61 N. Y. 123, 127 (1874).
564 Sandf. Ch. 379, 380 (N. Y. x846).
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physicians who were in professional attendance at the asylum.
Williams took charge of the internal police and financial arrange-
ments. Two of the partners were excluded by the third. The
principal value of the establishment was its good will. The court
said "It is useless to trace the origin and growth of this good will.
All the partners contributed to it, and whether in equal or unequal
proportions, is quite immaterial. It belongs equally to them all."
This language is in striking contrast to that used by another New
York court in McCall v. Moschowitz. 57 Three partners were engaged
in dressmaking. S. M. Moschowitz was a dressmaking expert.
He had charge of the manufacturing department. H. Moschowitz
conducted the selling department. McCall took charge of the
financial affairs. It appeared that McCall's services were badly
needed by the other two, which was the reason for the formation of
the partnership. McCall directed from whom and in what amounts
goods should be bought. Yet, in an accounting, at the death of
McCall, the court instructed the referee not to include good will.
In its opinion, the good will depended largely upon the skill of the
expert dressmaker. The court did not recognize that it was the
service of McCall which made the business a "going concern."5 8
It was he who established that connection59 in trade which induced
success. Suppose these partners had employed a dressmaker. Then,
would there be any doubt that there was a good will which belonged
to the partners? Although good will may have its origin in and arise
out of qualities of personality, it is merely the benefit which results
from the attitude of customers toward the firm.6 0 Courts have failed
to perceive that good will depends for its existence upon the attitude
of the public rather than upon the continued efforts of the particular
partner who was instrumental in creating it. A going concern has
a momentum which is of value apart from the continued efforts of
the creator of it.
PROFESSIONAL GOOD WILL
Professional good will is merely one kind of personal good will."'
Story says that good will cannot constitute a part of the partnership
effects in a professional business which is "almost necessarily con-
nected with personal skill and confidence in the particular partner-
67I State Rep. 99, i8 (N. Y. 1886). The decision may be justified by an
implication of the contract of partnership.
61GiLmoRE, supra note 18 at 14o. See Williams v. Farrand, supra note 54 at
483; ALLAN, supra note 17 at i.
59Supra note 20.
60FOREMAN, supra note 3 at 646.
61ALLAN-, supra note 17 at 41.
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ship." 12 It has often been asserted that good will cannot arise in a
professional business. 61 If, as Pollock says, good will is a commercial
term, rather than a legal one, this is not true.1 An editor, a physi-
cian or a lawyer often creates an invaluable property right in the
form of good will. Whatever may have been the objection to the
sale of the good will of a professional man, such sales have long been
made. Burdick says that the view that professional good will is not
salable, because it is entirely personal, is based largely upon Lord
Eldon's narrow definition.6 It has been urged that a man cannot
divest himself of his personalty. The contention that he can't is
irrelevant. It confuses the end of effort with the source of it. The
advantages due to efficient services may be so intimately personal
as to make them incapable of assignment.66 They are not always so.
The good will of a professional business has been said to be so
exclusively based upon personal confidence that it is not susceptible
of sale. 67 Yet it is not'unusual for physicians and lawyers to sell
their practice.6" In Christie v. Clarke,9 the court said that, in fact,
every day experience shows that there is a good will attached to a
professional as well as to any other kind of business, and that it may
be the subject of purchase and sale. If the parties have fixed a price
upon it or have provided a means of ascertaining its value, it stands
upon the same footing as any other business. In Hoyt v. Holly,7 0
which was decided in 1872, a physician in Greenwich who intended
to establish himself in the adjoining town, agreed to recommend the
defendant to'his patients in the village and to use his influence to
induce them to employ him. In an action to recover the $500, which
was the consideration of the agreement, it was argued that patients
of the plaintiff were entitled to his free, fair and unprejudiced judg-
ment, whenever inquiry should be made of him as to whom they
ought to employ as their physician. Any influence exercised upon
1Supra note ii at 173.
63Note, 96 AM. ST. REP. 612; BATES, supra note 13 § 668.
""... Where a person acquires a reputation for skill and learning in aparticular
profession, as for instance, in that of a lawyer, a physician or an editor, he often
creates an intangible but valuable property by winning the confidence of his
patrons and securing immunity from successful competition for their business,
and it would seem well settled that it is a-species of goodwill which may be the
subject of transfer." 12 R. C. L. 978. See 14 A. & E. ENc. (2d ed. igoo) 1o85.
66BURDICK, ON PARTNERSHIP (3rd ed. 1917) 373.
"ROGERS, supra note 36 at 22. In Read v. Mackay, 47 Misc. 435, 440, 95
N. Y. Supp. 935 (Sup. Ct. 19o5) the court said "It is impossible to transfer the
individual attributes of the members of a professional firm so as to invest the
transferee with the possession of them."
"
TSupra note 2 at 71.
68Note on Good Will, 15 Fed. 315 (x883); 14 A. & E. ENc. I091.
6916 U. C. C. P. 544, 550 (1866).
7039 Conn. 326 (x872).
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them for reward would be fraud, it was urged. By a divided court of
3 to 2, the argument was rejected and the contract held not void.
A consideration of the decisions involving good will, grouped
according to specific professions, may serve to clarify the problem.
After discussing the first group of cases, it seems desirable to digress
briefly in order to disclose the relation which a covenant not to
compete, or to retire from practice within a given area, bears to
professional good will.
i. Physicians, surgeons and dentists. An executrix,71 who sold
the good will of her testator, who was a surgeon-dentist, must account
for the £5oo, which she received for it. Yetwhere one of two partners,
who are dentists,72 continues to practice after the other becomes
insane, he is not responsible for good will to the other, where he
continued on his own account. In Farr v. Pearce,73 Farr paid £2000
as a premium to become a partner of Pearce, who was a surgesn,
apothecary and man-midwife of experience. By the agreement if
either of them should die before the end of I4 years, which was the
term of the partnership, the survivor was to "take the whole of the
said partnership stocks, monies, goods, debts and effects whatever"
and to pay to the deceased's estate his share "according to the yearly
account last before made." The surviving partner, under such a
contract, would not have to account for good will if it formed no
part of the yearly account. But, the Vice Chancellor 74 said that
"if the general question had arisen here .... it would have been
difficult to maintain that where a partnership is, formed between
professional persons, as surgeons, and one dies, the other is obliged
to give up his business and sell the connection for the joint benefit
of himself and the estate of the deceased partner. When such
partnerships determine, unless there be stipulations to the contrary,
each must be at liberty to continue his own exertions, and where the
determination is by the death of one, the right of the survivor cannot
be affected. Such partnerships are very different from commercial
partnerships."
Where a surgeon chiropodist 75 sold her business and the good will
71Smale v. Graves, 3 DeG. & Sm. 706 (185o).2Wightman v. Wightman, 223 Mass. 398, III N. E. 881 (1916).
33 Madd. 74 (1818).
USir John Leach at 78.
75Brown v. Benzinger, i i8 Md. 29, 84 Atl. 79 (1912). In Maxwell v. Sherman,
172 Ala. 626, 55 So. 520 (1911) the court overruled a demurrer to a complaint
alleging misrepresentation in the sale of the good will and practice of a physician.
In Bradbury v. Bardin, 35 Conn. 577 (1869) recovery for fraud in a similar sale
was sustained. In Townsend v. Hurst, 37 Miss. 679 (1859) a contract was re-
scinded on the same ground, and the collection of a note given for price was
enjoined.
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thereof, representing that she was leaving Baltimore, and two months
later re-opened an office there, she was enjoined from competing
with the vendee within the limits over which her practice had ex-
tended, although there was no covenant not to re-engage in business.
The vendor received from the sale a sum largely in excess of the
tangible assets. To allow her to compete with the vendee would be
fraud and in derogation of her grant. In Massachusetts, "The
sale of the practice and good will of a physician within certain limits
is the legitimate subject matter of a contract, and carries with it the
implied covenant, as in other sales, that the vendor will not himself
do anything to disturb or injure the vendee in the enjoyment of that
which he has purchased.""6
THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT
Much of the confusion regarding good will has been attributed
to the failure to distinguish between various forms of good will.
Good will has been used to characterize the advantage arising from
excluding the retiring partner as a rival in the same business. His-
torically, the idea of good will seems to have arisen in connection
with the legality of covenants in restraint of trade.78 Later, it was
recognized as of value apart from a covenant. It is sometimes urged
that a sale of professional good will consists of nothing more than
the advantage which results from the agreement to abstain from
competition with the vendee.79 If that were true, then the vendee
would secure no greater advantage than every other practitioner
in the same profession in that community would secure. 0 The weak-
ness of such a contention lies in the failure to recognize that an
76Dwight v. Hamilton, 113 Mass. 175, 177 (1873). Generally, the mere sale
of good will does not carry with it by implication a covenant that the vendor
will not re-engage in the same business. HoPxINS, supra note 41 at 233; HIGH,
ON INJUNCTIONS (4th ed. 19o5) § 1169. Harrison v. Gardner, 2 Madd. 198, 219
(1817); infra note 88.
77STORY, supra note II; MECHEM, supra note 15; Lobeckv. Lee-Clark-Anderson
Hardware Co., 37 Neb. I58, i69, 55 N. W. 65o (1893).
78ALLAN, supra note 17 at 3.79
"Neither an editor, a lawyer or a physician can transfer to another his style,
his learning or manners. Either, however, can add to the chances ofsuccess and
profit of another who embarks in the same business in the samefieldbywithdraw-
ing as a competitor." Cowan v. Fairbrother, 118 N. C. 4o6, 411, 24 S. E. 212
(1896). "... very frequently the goodwill of a business or profession, without
any interest in the land connected with it, is made the subject of sale, though
there is nothing tangible in it; it is merely the advantage of the recommendation
of the vendor to his connections, and his agreeing to abstain from all competition
with the vendee." Pollock, C. B., in Potter v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue,
1o Ex. 147, 157 (1854).801n French v. Parker, I6 R. I. 219, 14 Atl. 870 (1888), the vendee paid over$5,ooo for the practice, in addition to sio,ooo for the tangible property, of a
physician and surgeon.
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important advantage which inures to the purchaser of good will
arises from the fact that he can hold himself out to the public as the
vendor's successor."' If the business is dependent upon personal
qualities and the vendor does not covenant to retire or refrain from
competition, how can the vendee avail himself of the value of success-
orship ?8
Lord Eldon aptly characterized such stipulations as merely "an-
other way in which the good will of a trade may be rendered still
more valuable."8 In Munsey v. Butterfield,84 the vendor agreed to
sell certain articles of personal property used in his milk business,
together with the good will of his milk route. The personal property
was worth less than $i,ooo. The good will was the most valuable
part of the business. The vendor purchased another route which
covered the same territory. The vendee refused to perform when he
learned of the purchase. The court held that the contract for the
sale of the good will of the milk route implied an agreement by the
vendor to retire from it and allow the vendee the benefits of it and
that he would do nothing to impair or injure it. The vendee did not
agree to pay for the right to run a milk route over the territory.
He did not have that exclusive right. He did not pay for the right
of getting customers. He acquired "the right to the business of
running the milk route as the circumstance, the conduct and the
influence of the plaintiff had made, and this right could be acquired
only by the agreement of the plaintiff not to interfere with the
business,-to use the opportunities and influences which had built it
up to impair it." Similiarly, where one sold all his right, title and
good will to the Oakland paper route, 88 the court held that the vendor
was not at liberty "to filch away from the plaintiff the veritable
substance of that which he sold. It was not like the setting up of an-
other business of the same kind, but it was taking away the very
thing that he sold." In both these cases the covenant is implied be-
cause the consideration paid for good will would fail entirely if it
81Knoedler v. Boussod, 47 Fed. 465, 466 (Cir. Ct. S. D. N. Y. I89i).
82ALLAN, supra note 17 at 84.
83Kennedy v. Lee, 3 Mer. 441, 452 (1817).
"i33 Mass. 492 (1882).
BsSupra note 84 at 494.88Wenzel v. Barbin, 189 Pa. 502, 42 Atl. 44 (1899). "Suppose a solicitor sells
his business, say at five years' purchase, which is by no means uncommon, could
he, having offices on the first floor, paint up his name and receive his clients
as usual because they choose to come to him, even if he didnot actually askthem
to come and transact business with him? The answer would be that he was
stealing that which he sold, and any conduct more outrageous and more opposed
to morality or law could not well be imagined." Jessel, M. R. in Genesi v. Cooper,
supra note 7 at 599.
THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
were not. It was merely a device used to protect the good will
purchased.87
Generally, according to the decisions, the sale of the good will of
a business does not carry with it a restriction not to compete in the
absence of an express agreement. 88 The validity of such covenants
is beyond dispute. 89 In the sale of the practice of a physician, they
have been quite common.90 Some jurisdictions, however, hold that
the sale of the good will of a professional man carries with it the
obligation to abstain from practice within the territorial limits of
competition with his vendee.9
2. Solicitors and attorneys. Pollock says that in the business
of solicitors it seems that good will in the ordinary sense hardly
exists.0 In Austen v. Boys,93 the term 'good will' seemed to the
Lord Chancellor wholly inapplicable. He said merely "to sell the
goodwill without anything more, and without arranging any price,
would be an agreement incapable of being enforced by specific
performance." In Arundell v. Bell,9 4 Baggalay, L. J., was not prepared
to say that in no case of a dissolution of a partnership of solicitors
there may not be something analogous to good will. In Burchell v.
Wilde,9 good will was assumed to exist in such a partnership. In
Fitch v. Dewes,98 there was no doubt of it. The cases dealing with
good will in winding up professional partnerships are few. 7 Often,
in the discussion of the cases, there is a failure to perceive that, in
a commercial sense, there is an actual good will, but that the court
is unable to make it available to the vendee. If it cannot, there
VFOREMAN, supra note 3 at 641.
8SSupra note 76; Hutchinson v. Nay, 187 Mass. 262, 264, 72 N. E. 974 (905);
Morgan v. Schuyler (dentist), 79 N. Y. 490 (i88o); Faust v. Rohr, I66 N. C.
187, 197, 81 S. E. 1O96 (i914).
89 Davis v. Mason, 5 T. R. 118, 120 (1793); Boutelle v. Smith, 116 Mass. iii,
(1874); Beal v. Chase, 31 Mich. 529 (1875).
w
0Beatty v. Cable, 142 Ind. 329, 41 N. E. 590 (1895); Warfield v. Booth, 33
Md. 63 (1870); Mandeville v. Harmon, 42 N.J. Eq. 185,7 AtI. 37 (1886); Niles v.
enn (dentists) 12, Misc. 470,33 N.Y . Supp. 857 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1895); Wolff v.
Hirschfeld, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 670, 57 S. W. 572 (1900); Butler v. Bureson, 16
Vt. 76 (1844); McIntyre v. Belcher, 0 jur. (N. S.) 239 (1864). InTichenorv.
Newman, 186 Il. 264,57 N.E. 826 (1900) covenant restricted practice to specialty
within certain territory. See: Foss v. Roby, 535 Mass. 292, 81 N. E. i99 (1907);
Boutelle v. Smith (baker), 116 Mass. 111 (1874); Faust v. Rohr, 166 N. C. x87,
81 S. E. 1096 (1914); Tode v. Gross (cheesemaker), 127 N. Y. 480, 28 N-: E. 469
(1891); Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Ad. & El. 4,38 (1837).
015o Tex. Civ. App. 405, ii i S. W. 768 (i908); May v. Thomson, L. R. 20 Ch.
D. 705 (1882).
02Supra note 21 at 126.
932 DeG. and J. 626, 6.36 (1858).
'452 L. J. Chi. 537, 539 (188,3).
'582 L. T. 576 (19oo).
96Fitch v. Dewes [1921] 2 A. C. 158, x68.
STWinding up Professional Partnerships, (1919) 33 HAV. L. REv. 1070, 1071.
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can be no legal good will in that instance. To say that there is no
good will in a professional partnership, when an administratrix is
required to account for it, if she sells it, is more than strange.
Various reasons have been given for the refusal of the courts to
recognize professional good will. It has been deemed too insignifi-
cant to be taken notice of."' Its value is unreliable, if not imaginary.99
The advantage to be derived from it is too ephemeral or indetermi-
nate."' It is utterly impracticable to define any standard by which
to estimate the professional advantage derived from it.l °i The
difficulty seems to be in fixing a value upon it. If the parties have
fixed the value, the courts have no hesitancy in recognizing the
existence of the professional good will.1
3. Brokers, commission merchants and insurance agents. In
Raymond v. Vaughan,"0 the parties were brokers in the wholesale
sugar market. One partner was committed to the asylum; the other
continued to carry on the business. The latter was required to
account for the good will of the business. Fourteen years later,
the same Illinois court criticised the case, saying "We see no reason
why there should be good will to such a business independent of a
special contract, more than in a business purely professional, as in
the case of a physician or attorney at law." 10 The court concluded,
as a matter of law, that commission merchants had no good will of
which the court could take cognizance in the absence of a special
contract. The court approved of the Chancellor's exclusion of the
proof of custom with reference to the good will and the evidence of
its value, although it appeared that the firm was a going concern,
doing a business, the net profits of which amounted to more than
$5,ooo a month, with customers scattered over the United States.
However, twenty years later, in Witkowsky v. Affeld, 05 Illinois held
that in an insurance agency, the good will was an asset to which
the deceased partner is entitled to share. As early as 1858, in speak-
ing of commission merchants, Sir John Stuart said "The nature of
the business was such as to make the good-will a matter of value.
In previous partnerships for carrying on the same sort of business
98SMITH, MERCANTILE LAW (Pomeroy ed. 1887) § 247.
99Slack v. Suddoth, iO2 Tenn. 375, 379, 52 S. W. 182 (1899).10M'Farland v. Stewart, 2 Watts III, 112 (Pa. 1833).
011Holden's Adm'rs v. M'Maldn, I Pars. Eq. Cas. 270, 302 (Pa. 1847).
102Supra note 69. See Bozon v. Farlow, I Mer. 459 (I816); Aubin v. Holt,
2 K. & 3. 66 (1855).
1317 Ill. App. 144 (1885).104Douthart v. Logan, 86 Ill. App. 294, 313 (1899).
16283 IUI 557, 1i9 N. E. 630 (1918).
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the good-will had been the subject of stipulation. It must, therefore
be held to be of some value."'0
In Wilson v. Williams, 107 the Vice Chancellor declared that the
good will of stockbrokers would be valueless in the absence of a
restrictive covenant. Burdick says that such statements are based
upon the narrow definition of Lord Eldon.108 The Vice Chancellor
said, "Without going so far as to lay down any hard and fast rule
as to the stockbrokers' business being, in every case, incapable of
goodwill, I hold that in this case there is no salable goodwill."' 09
In Hill v. Fearis,"0 the court thought that it was impossible to say
that the advantage that came from being the successor of an old
stockbroker and carrying on the original business had no pecuniary
value. The court seemed to think that if the Vice Chancellor had
had before him the speeches of the learned Lords in Trego v. Hunt,
he would not have decided the case on the same narrow notions of
good will.
However, courts differ not merely in their notions of good will
but also in their comprehension of the significance of facts. In the
insurance cases,"' one court says that the agencies which the partner-
ship had secured were terminable at the will of the principals, and
there could be no property in themYM Another court replies "Not-
withstanding the precarious value of such right, there seems to be
no good reason why it should not be recognized and protected by the
law.""' Why? Because it is a valuable interest. 14  Purchasers
can be found who would be willing to pay a large consideration for
such an interest in an established agency. A judge can not discover
that fact in studious isolation. If the court excludes all evidence of
custom as to good will and its value, its decision will be deduced
from predetermined conceptions. Dean Pound has reminded us
that the "Liberalizing of the English law through the law merchant
was brought about by substituting business practice for juridical
106Macdonald v. Richardson, i Giff. 81, 86 (1858).
10729 L. R. Ir. 176 (1892). Accord: Davis v. Hodgson, 25 Beavan 177 (1858).
Cf. In re Brown, 242 N. Y. I, i5O N. E. 581 (1926).13OSupra note 65.
I10Supra note 107 at 184. Accord: Scudder v. Ames (commission merchants),
1c42 Mo. 187, 43 S. W. 659 (1897).
110i Ch. 466 (19o5).
"'iThe good will of insurance agents was recognized in Barber v. Conn. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 15 Fed. 312 (Cir. Ct. N. D. N. Y. 1883) and Sheppard v. Boggs, 9
Neb. 257, 2 N. W. 370 (1879). Contra: Smith v. Smith, 51 La. Ann. 72, 24 SO.
68 (8); Tierney v. Klein, 67 Miss. 173, 6 SO. 739 (1889); Dyer v. Shove, 20
R. I. 259, 38 A. 498 (x897); Rice v. Angell, 3Tx 5,I .W 3 18)112Rice v. Angell, supra note III at 354.
luBarber v. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra note Iii at 313.
1rIn Thompson v. Winnebago Co., 48 Ia. 155 (1878) the administrator was
compelled to account for the good will of a land agent.
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conceptions."' 15 The problem of the law is one of continuous adapta-
tion. New interests, which have arisen in the development of modem
business methods,"6 can be accorded just recognition by the law only
by a proper appreciation of their factual significance.
4. Editors. Under a statute, enacted in Maryland in 1798, the
court held that the good will of a newspaper, the American Chronicle,
was not an asset in the hands of the administrator because it was of
"inappreciable value, and of too uncertain and contingent a nature
to be the subject of appraisement and estimation."" 7 In the reign
of George II, however, the executrix of the printer" 8 of St. James's
Evening Post was obliged to account for the good will of it to the
children of the printer, who claimed under the will and custom of
London. In purely literary partnerships, it has been said, the
doctrine, which repudiates the existence of anything like good will,
would be applied. But, in a quasi literary partnership like the
Saturday Courier, a newspaper," 9 the chief value of which consisted
in the subscription list and good will, clearly a different one must
apply. The evidence in the case showed that the deceased, Holden,
had charge of the editorial department and by his literary ability
had given the paper such a reputation as to increase its circulation
from 22,000 to 55,ooo. The court justifies allowing for the good will
on the ground that a great portion of the material in the journal was
not the product of the editor, but the usual melange which fills up
the modem (1847) newspaper, advertisements among other things.
A significant fact was that the mechanical equipment had been
appraised at $3,ooo and the subscription list and good will, which,
in 1861, Maryland regarded as valueless, was appraised at $6o,ooo.
The good will of a newspaper has been declared 20 to bemore tangible
than the probability that the customers will resort to the old place
or than a restrictive covenant. The court does not give the test of
tangibility by which it arrived at this conclusion. The good will of
a newspaper is often its greatest value. In Dayton v. Wilkes,uI upon
the dissolution of the partnership in 1859, the court appointed a
receiver to protect the good will of Porter's Spirit of the Times. Why
has there been such ready legal recognition of the good will of a
n'Supra note 26 at 6i1.
"'Macfadden v. Jenkins (real estate and loan business) 40 N.-D. 422, 169N. W. iSi (1920).N"Seighman v. Marshall, 17 Md. 550, 569 (1861).
UsGibblett v. Read, 9 Mod. 459 (17 Geo. 2) (I743).19Holden's Adm'rs v. M'Makin, supra note ioi.
'
2 OBoon v. Moss, 7o N. Y. 465, 474 (1877).
m17 How. Pr. 5io (1859).
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newspaper, from the days of George II, which antedate Lord Eldon's
famous pronouncement as to what constitutes good will? 'Vice
Chancellor Pitney suggests that it is because "The newspaper is
an established institution of modem society. It supplies an absolute
need or want. Society could not go on without it. Among its re-
quisites are that it should have continuity, and to that end, a name
by which it is known, and which gives it identity and enables it to
have continuity independent of ownership."'
One of the most finely human cases to be found in the books is
Bradbury v. Dickens.'2 Charles Dickens entered into partnership
with his printers and publishers to establish a weekly periodical,
Household Words. Dickens was appointed editor with absolute
control over the literary department. As editor and for such articles
as he might contribute, he was to receive a compensation of £500
annually; as partner, he was to receive half of the profits. A mis-
understanding brought about a dissolution of the partnership ten
years later. Dickens gave notice to the public that Household Words
would be discontinued and he would establish, as its successor,
another weekly periodical. His partners sought to enjoin him from
appropriating to himself, or from doing damage to, the "continuity,
goodwill and succession" of Househwld Words. They also prayed that
the copyright of Household Words be forthwith sold as a going concern.
Dickens' counsel opposed the sale because the very essence of the
work was Mr. Dickens. With his retirement, it must cease. They
urged that any attempt to continue it without the mental machinery
which gave it value would be a fraud upon the public. It might do
serious injury to the literary reputation of Mr. Dickens. The Master
of the Rolls, Sir John Romilly, felt the force of the argument very
strongly. He said, "His mere retirement may de facto annihilate'it,
for its existence and value may entirely and solely depend on his
name being associated with it." 'u4 Then, he wisely added, "That
however is a matter which can only be determined by the result."
The name was sold at auction because he was of the opinion that it
belonged to the partners regardless of its value. Much to Sir John's
surprise, it brought the nice little sum of £3,55o. When his prophecy
failed, the prophet felt the necessity of explaining how it happened.
At least, explanation under such circumstances is customary. At
any rate, in Melersh v. Keen,12 he said that, in Bradbury v. Dickens,
1nLane v. Smythe, 46 N. J. Eq. 443, 454, 19 AtI. z99 (189o).
1227 Beavan 52 (1859).
"-Supra note 123 at 61.
M28 Beavan 453, 455 (i86o).
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"I entertained a very considerable doubt whether the mere right of
using the title Household Words was worth anything, and my belief
now is that if Mr. Dickens had not bid for it for himself, it would
have sold for little or nothing." In other words, if those who are
most interested in buying an article sold at auction, do not bid on it,
that which is sold will bring little. The world is not apt to quarrel
with Sir John on that proposition.
5. Musicians. A similar question arose in Bailly v. Betti.12 A
group of distinguished artists entered into partnership to give
musical performances under the name of the Flonzaley Quartet.
Subsequently, when notice of dissolution of the partnership was given,
it was denied that Bailly had any interest, as partner, in the assets
except in some sheet music. It appeared th~at the other partners
had announced that a fourth person would be secured in place of
Bailly and that the Flonzaley Quartet would continue to give its
musical performances. Bailly sought an accounting; he asked for
a sale of the assets of the partnership, including the firm name, and
an injunction restraining them from giving musical performances
under the firm name. The Court of Appeals of New York approved
of the views of the lower courts that the name Flonzaley Quartet
was not an asset which could be sold and its proceeds distributed
among the partners. 27  It considered that good will included the
firm name only in commercial partnerships, where good will includes
"such elements as reasonable prices, good quality of merchandise,
and fair dealing, which are more or less impersonal." The court
concluded "It has, however, never been held that a business dependent
solely on the personal skill and professional qualifications of the
persons carrying it on could be sold or be transferred to any one who
might desire to purchase on a sale."' 28
Why is not fair dealing personal? How can there be reasonable
prices unless there is managerial efficiency? How can there be a
good quality of merchandise unless there is a superiority in the
selection of goods or the choosing of others to do it that betokens
good judgment? The court, however, seems to overlook what was
the controlling element of the case. Was there an advantage which
could be made available to a vendee? In Trego v. Hunt,'29 Lord
Herschell approved the declaration of Sir George Jessel that "Attract-
ing customers to the business is a matter of carrying it on. It is the
'26241 N. Y. 22, 148 N. E. 776 (1925).
127A criticism of the case will be found in a note in (1926) xx CORNELLILAw
QUARTERLY 256.
128Supra note 126 at 26.12Supra note 9 at 17.
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formation of that connection which has made the value" of the good
will."5 Its value depends upon what can be got for the chance of being
able to keep that connection. Or as he said "It is the whole advan-
tage, whatever it may be, of the reputation and connection of the
firm, which may have been built up by years of honest work or gained
by lavish expenditure of money."'' If that advantage can bemade
available to a vendee, it is a partnership asset.
A corporate name does not import a declaration that the indi-
viduals, whose names appear therein, will always remain in the
corporation."12 Any group of men whose membership may change
is an entity separate from its constituent members."' To refuse to
recognize the existence of a partnership or voluntary association as
an entity is to shut one's eyes to the facts. 34 Whether one means a
unit entity or a group entity is of no importance in solving the
problem.15
Suppose that the Flonzaley Quartet had received each year several
thousand dollars worth of engagements without solicitation, is there
any doubt that such an advantage was of distinct value and could be
made available to the successors of the group which had dissolved
partnership? Since the decision of Bailly v. Betti, the present group
advertises that "In the twenty-two years of its existence the Flonzaley
Quartet has made its name the standard in chamber music by which
all other string quartets are judged." Their advertisements dis-
close that the present group has appropriated a valuable advantage,
which belonged to the dissolved partnership. The fact that they
have continued to use the name is indicative of the benefit derived
from it."' The advantage derived from the familiarity of the public
with the name, which was the result of years of effort and expense
in advertising and solicitation, has been wrongfully appropriated
by them."37
Compare this case with Messer v. The Fadettes.338 In i888, Ethel
Atwood organized an orchestra under the name of Fadette's Ladies
Orchestra. In 1895, the organizer sold to the plaintiff all her right,
13OGenisi v. Cooper, supra note 7.13Supra note 9 at 24.
InHolmes et al. v. Holmes, Booth & Atwood Mfg. Co., 37 Conn. 278, 297
(1870).
UMachen, Corporate Personality, (1910) 24 HARv. L. REV. 253, 259.
l 4Supra note 133 at 26o.l*nDrake, Partnership Entity and Tenancy in Partnership; The Struggle for a
Definition (1916) 15 MIcH. L. REv. 609.136Shaver v. Shaver,, 54 Ia. 2o8 (88o).
-3Rowell v. Rowell, 122 Wis. 1, 17, 99 N. W. 473 (19o4); Beninger v. Clark,
10 138 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 264, 268 (1870).13Sx68 Mass. 140, 46 N. E. 407 (1897).
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title and interest in the organization, together with her right to the
name Fadette's Ladies Orchestra. At the time of the sale, and for
some time thereafter, the orchestra was composed substantially of
the same members as before the sale. Subsequently, some members
withdrew from it and incorporated as The Fadettes and gave musical
concerts. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the use of the name which
she had purchased. The court found that the success of the orchestra
was due to the ability, skill and personal supervision of Atwood and
was not assignable. It said that any influence beneficial to the
plaintiff, that the name would have upon the public would be to
mislead and defraud them by implying that she and such musicians
as she employed were the same persons who had formerly gained a
good reputation under this name.", At the time of filing of the bill
no member of the former organization, except the plaintiff, remained.
After the sale, it appeared that the plaintiff had given at least one
entertainment under the name of Fadette's Ladies Orchestra. The
members of the original orchestra had not agreed to remain with the
plaintiff's organization. The injunction was refused.
There was, however, a dissenting opinion. It was based upon the
ground that the name had been sold with a going concern. Both
with fervor and with pertinency, the dissenting judge said "The
Boston Symphony Orchestra owes its fame to its various leaders. If
this name is a trade name it is assignable. Could it be held that
members of the orchestra who chose to leave it could associate them-
selves together and perform under this name without being liable
to be restrained by injunction?"' 39
Of course, the name of "Sousa" in connection with the band im-
plies his skill, science and art. 40 Even against him, the assignment
of his name will not be enforced in equity, because it would be a
fraud and imposition upon the public. Similarly, the former em-
ployees appearing in Christy's Minstrels will be restrained from
appropriating that name, to which Christy had given repute by the
expenditure of time, labor and money.'4
In the case of the Flonzaley Quartet, either the name was personal
or it was not. In any event, each member of the quartet had the
same right to its use after dissolution if the name was not sold. It
was not sold, because the court would not permit it to be. If the
decision on The Fadettes is sound,'4 then the New York Court of
139Supra note 138 at 144.
"'Blakely v. Sousa, 197 Pa. 305, 333, 47 Atl. 289 (1900).
"'Christy v. Murphy, 12How. Pr. 77 (N. Y. 1856).
"'The New York Court of Appeals cites the case with approval in In re Brown,
242 N. Y. i, ii, 15o N. E. 581, 584 (1926).
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Appeals was in error in refusing to grant the injunction restraining
the defendants from the use of the name. The implication in the
case of The Faderes is that if the assignee had not attempted to use
the name which was assigned, she would have been guilty of no fraud
on the public and to protect the good will which she purchased the
court would have restrained the defendants. Consistency required
the New York court to order a sale of the name as an asset of the
partnership.
The good will of a firm may be inseparable from the firm name.lc
It is conceded that where the firm name designates the business,
and not merely the existing individuals, it belongs to the partner-
ship. The buyer's right to use impersonal names is generally well
settled. 44 A fictitious name is an impersonal one. It can be assigned
with the business.'4 No one can acquire the right to deceive the
public. 14 Therefore, the contract of a physician to practice in the
name of another is void. 47 An artist, who has acquired a reputation
which gives his works a higher market value than those of another,
cannot give the right to affix his name because it would be fraud upon
the public.148 But, one firn can acquire the right to represent itself
as the legitimate successor. of another. In doing so, it represents that
the old firm is extinguished and it is continuing the same kind of
business and enjoying its good will.149 Where the value of good will
lies in succession, what difference does it make whether the good will
is personal or otherwise, if a buyer can be found for it?80 In both
cases just considered, the advantages that would come from a direct
succession and continuation of the business were of great advertising
value. Where there is no fraud,' if the advantage can be made
available to the vendee, it ought to be sold.
Lindley says that the good will of a partnership may be practically
'"Slater v. Slater, 175 N. Y. 143, x47, 67 N. B. 224 (1903).
1"Williams v. Farrand, supra note 54 at 487.
'"Rowell v. Rowell, supra note 137 at 20, 479; MECHEM, supra note 15 at xi6.1 46ALLAN, supra note 17 at 22.
24 Jerome v. Bigelow, 66 I1. 452 (1872).
1'"Leather Cloth Co. Ltd. v. Am. Leather Cloth Co. Ltd., i i H. L. Cas. 523, 545.
H149utchins v. Page, 204 Mass. 284, 90 N. E. 565, 566 (i9IO); Morgan v.
Schuyler, 79 N. Y. 490, 495 (188o).
160"Men will pay for any privilege that gives reasonable expectation of prefer-
ence in the race of competition.... At one extreme there are expectancies so
strong that the advantage derived from economic opportunity may be said to
be a certainty; at the other are expectancies so weak that forany rational mind
they may be said to be illusory. We must know the facts in any case." Cardozo,
J., In re Brown, supra note i42 at 6 and at 582.
,"In Grow v. Seligman, 47 Mich. 607, Ii N. W. 4o4 (1882), for the vendee of
a clothier to carry on the business under the name of "Little Jake," his vendor's
trade name, the court held, would be to mislead the public.
GOOD WILL IN PROFESSIONAL PARTNERSHIPS 323
unsalable and worthless to any one excepting a former partner.525
To give efficacy to the sale, any of the partners may become pur-
chaser. If it is not salable, it cannot be treated as an asset. Courts
have strained for reasons for not selling professional good will. The
most artificial of all is presented in a Tennessee case, Slack v. Suddoth.'5
There, the court said that good will "implies something gained by
consent, not something realized by force or coercion." Yet, that case
was decided forty years after Vice Chancellor Wood said that good
will was "all that good disposition which customers entertain towards
the house of business identified by a particular name." Wooing
tactics may be necessary if the vendee is to secure the good will of
his vendor for which he bargains. Whether the sale is voluntary or
involuntary, the tactics would be the same.
6. Bankers. In Read v. Mackay,IM a firm of bankers and brokers
dissolved partnership. The business was founded in z832 and
Vermilye had been a part of the firm name from the origin of the
business, although it had been carried on by many successors. After
1862, the business was known as Vermilye & Co. At dissolution,
the partners could not agree as to the disposition of the name. It
does not appear that there was any partner by the name of Vermilye
in the firn. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the use of the firm name
by the defendants and asked that the good will of the partnership
be sold to the highest bidder. The court's ethical sense would not
permit the firm name to be transferred to a purchaser promiscuously
selected at a sale. It seemed to fear that the highest bidder would
be the one most in need and least entitled to wear it. With great
warmth, it says "What suggestion of morality, inductive or intui-
tive, supports the claim that one person should be permitted by
purchase to assume the good repute of others? I say good repute,
for in that only is the value of a firm name to be found which has
remained personal to the members of the firm collectively.' 16 The
court admits that if the partners had voluntarily sold the name for
the benefit of all, it would have been proper. But to allow a sale
under a decree and supervision of a court of equity would shock one's
moral sense. The court approved the dicta of Commissioner Dwight
that "It seems plain that if a banking house had acquired a name,
such as that of Baring Brothers, though there was no partner of the
l52Supra note 16 at 539. Goodwill and Injunctions against Dealing With Cus-
lomers of the Buiness (1880) 24 SOL. J. & REP. 833. WOERNER, supra note 16 at
438; Williams v. Wilson, 4 Sandf. Ch. 379, 381 (N. Y. 1846).
l5Supra note 98 at 381.
""47 Misc. 435, 95 N. Y. Supp. 935 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Sp. Term 19o5).
- Supra note 154 at 437.
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name of Baring, it would, on general principles of law, and inde-
pendent of a statute preventing the use of fictitious names, have a
property in such name."'' 5 The logic of the court is not very con-
vincing. It says that "the business name of this partnership is the
symbol used to denote the personal integrity and business qualities
of the present parties, the parties to this action, and this symbol
cannot be detached from the personnel of the partnership and sold
as an asset with the good will .... There must be imported into the
articles of a partnership, the business of which is dependent upon
personal attributes of the members of the finn and the confidence
of the patrons therein, a mutual understanding that with the termi-
nation of the partnership the use of the firm name shall come to an
end, unless the partners have otherwise expressly provided, which
is not here the case."''1 This means that ethically professional good
will, when attached to a name, which is the symbol of personal
integrity, can be alienated by voluntary sale, but not by forced sale.
Such a distinction seems insubstantial. The court, however, enjoined
the unathorized use of the name by one partner to protect the interest
of the other. This was not the result that the court arrived at in
the case of the Flonzaley Quartet. There the court would not prevent
some of the partners from appropriating the name on dissolution of
the partnership.
In an early case,' in Pennsylvania, the court was unable to compre-
hend how the good will of a banking firm could exist independently
of the property. The good will of a banking business may be assigned
and passed as assets for the benefit of creditors. "9 One who, as sur-
viving director, wrongfully appropriated the good will of the Bank of
Viroqua, a corporation, was required to account for the right to
use its name as its successor. As trustee, he was bound to dispose
of the good will with the tangible assets in the most advanta-
geous manner.160 In Smith v. Everett,' the bank was carried on under
the name of the New Sarum Bank. Smith died and Everett took in
a new partner, who paid him £io,ooo. The surviving partner was
obliged to pay £2,000 as Smith's share of the good will. Sir John
Romilly said "He might not have been entitled to use the words,
New Sarum Bank; but provided there was no bank in Salisbury called
the Old Sarum Bank, he might have changed the word 'new' into
256Glen & Hall Mfg. Co. v. Hall, 61 N. Y. 226 (1874). This dicta is also quoted
in Hegeman v. Hegeman, 8 Daly i, ii (N. Y. I88O).
157Supra note 154 at 441.
158Musselman and Clarkson's Appeal, 62 Pa. 8I (1869).15 Bank of Tomah v. Warren, 94 Wis. 151, 68 N. W. 549 (1896).16 Lindermann v. Rusk, 125 Wis. 210, 1o4 N. W. 126 (1905).
16127 Beavan 446 (1859).
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'old,' and carried on the business under that name and in exactly
the same place. It is therefore asy to see that the price which could
have been obtained by the sale of the goodwill, 'that is the right to
carry on the business under the name of the New Sarum Bank ....
was exceedingly small, not to say infinitesmal."'j In Mellersh v.
Keen,' a banking partnership was dissolved because of the mental
derangement of Keen. The court decreed an account to be taken
of the good will. Again, Sir John was laced with the difficulty of
ascertaining the value of good will, that entity of shadowy character.
Eight or nine bankers testified that it was "worth nothing." Yet,
Sir John approved the finding of the Chief Clerk that it was worth
about £2,300.
CONCLUSION
A review of the cases seems to disclose that during the first half
century which followed Lord Eldon's decision of Crutwell v. Lye
(i81o), the primitive idea that good will must have a physical attach-
ment was dominant. Since Churton v. Douglas (1859), there has been
a more rational application of the concept of good will according to
the facts of the different cases. The liberalizing influence of the
pronouncements in Trego v. Hunt (x896) seems to have caused many
courts to recognize that the value of mere succession has been greatly
enhanced by the emphasis which modem advertising has given to
psychical influences.
Certainly, a study of the decisions demonstrates amply the futility
of attempting to define good will in terms of any specific advantage
which may exist in any given case or group of cases. The difficulties
encountered by the courts seems to have been due to the application
of limited formal rules to situations which were constantly, if not
progressively, changing or which were dissimilar. The courts have
failed to realize that the advantage which may arise from good will
is dependent upon a diversity of factors, so varying as to defy ex-
clusive enumeration. The significant facts are the existence of a
good will and its availability to a vendee.
That a business may not have a good will is clear.16 That pro-
fessional good will may in fact exist equally admits of no doubt.
But, in the case of a lawyer or a physician, in the absence of a special
contract fixing a value upon it and protecting it by a restrictive
'62Supra note x61 at 452.
16327 Beavan 236 (1859).
'"Schaefer Brewing Co. v. Moebs, 187 Mass. 57I, 73 N. E. 858 (1905); Fox v.
Produce Cold Exchange, 192 Il. App. 3oi (1915); WOERNER, supra note I6.
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covenant, when necessary, it is difficult to see how the court can
give effective legal recognition to its factual existence. Many courts,
however, have failed to perceive that in origin good will is largely
personal. They have confused the result with the means. The
rigid classification of good will into local and personal has obscured
the issue in many cases. The question is not: Is the good will personal?
The solution of any controversy regarding good will seems to be
dependent upon two questions: i. Does good will in fact exist?
2. May the benefit of it, under the circumstances, be made available
to the vendee without fraud upon the public? If these two questions
can be answered in the affirmative, what the source of the good will
was, would appear to be of no consequence. If the law is to be con-
sonant with fact, the court must recognize good will as far as is
effectively possible. To the extent that it fails, it fails as an-instru-
ment of justice.
